Nataliya Shevchenko

Ph. D. (History), Associate Professor

Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv, Ukraine

ORCID logo–0002–2967–2607

Abstract. The aim of this article is to study the positions of the leading states of the Latin American region and the Caribbean on the issue of Ukraine’s territorial integrity in the context of the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014. The research methodology is based on the principle of historicism and problem-chronological and integrated approaches, comparative and analytical methods, which helped to trace the positions of the states of the region on this issue when voting for the UN General Assembly resolution on the territorial integrity of Ukraine of March 27, 2014 and to determine internal and external factors that might affect them. The scientific novelty of the study is based on the fact that for the first time in the Ukrainian historical science the author conducted a comprehensive analysis of the positions of the LAC states on this issue. Obtained results will help our Ministry of Foreign Affairs in shaping Ukraine’s strategy in this region, including in the context of the implementation of the «Crimean Platform».

Conclusions: In their attitude to the territorial integrity of Ukraine, the LAC countries were divided into several regional groups. Mainly the countries of the Pacific Alliance and some states of Central America and the Caribbean supported the territorial integrity of Ukraine. The annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation was supported by the main members of the Bolivarian Alliance (ALBA) – Bolivia, Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua. The members of the regional association MERCOSUR and part of the English–speaking states of the Caribbean have shown «restrained» positions. The «Crimean precedent» has become not only a «challenge» for regional security, but also a «challenge» at the global level. This showed that the LAC countries, which for the past several decades in a multipolar world have tried to position themselves in the international arena as states that do not recognize the division into «spheres of influence» during the Cold War and build their relations on the basis of equal partnership, in fact have demonstrated not just solidarity with the Russian Federation, but the recognition of its sphere of geopolitical influence in Ukraine and, more broadly, in the post–Soviet space and in Eastern Europe. And this, in turn, could potentially lead to attempts to restore «spheres of influence» in other parts of the world, including the Western Hemisphere itself.

Key words: annexation of Crimea, Latin America, Caribbean, Russian Federation.

Submitted 19.06.2021



  1. Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media of the Russian Federation. (2014, October 9). The Russia Today TV channel began broadcasting in Spanish in Argentina. [In Russian].
  2. Website of the President of Russia. (2014, July 12). Visit to Nicaragua. [In Russian].
  3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. (2014, March 24). Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks and answers to media questions at a press conference on the sidelines of the Nuclear Security Summit, The Hague. [In Russian].
  4. Ukrainian Pravda. (2017, March 23). The UN General Assembly supported the territorial integrity of Ukraine. [In Ukrainian].
  5. Zadorozhnyi, O. V. (2015) The annexation of Crimea is an international crime: a monograph. Kyiv: K.I.S. [In Ukrainian].
  6. Embassy of Ukraine in the United Mexican States. (2014, March 5). Statement by the Government of Costa Rica on support for Ukraine. [In Ukrainian].
  7. Embassy of Ukraine in the United Mexican States. (2014, March 5). Statement of the Government of Mexico on support for Ukraine in the situation in Crimea dated [In Ukrainian].
  8. Bering-Bellingshausen Institute. [In Russian].
  9. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. (2014, May 17). Interview of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Sergey V. Lavrov to the TV channel «Russia» for the program «Vesti on Saturday with Sergei Brilev». [In Russian].
  10. Russkiy Mir Foundation. Russian World Offices. [In Russian].
  11. Russkiy Mir Foundation. Catalog of Russian Centers. [In Russian].
  12. Kovalova, O. (2019). Venezuela: what is Russia looking for in a distant land? Black Sea Security: Journal, 3 (35), 80-95. [In Ukrainian].
  13. Kondratenko, O. (2019). Latin-Caribbean America in the geostrategy of the Russian Federation. American History and Politics, 7, 48-64. DOI: 10.17721/2521-1706.2019.07.48-64.
  14. Haber, Ye. et al., (Eds.). (2020). Concept of foreign policy of Ukraine: expert recommendations. Ch. 5. Latin America and the Caribbean. [In Ukrainian].
  15. World Coordination Council of Russian Compatriots Living Abroad. Coordination Councils. [In Russian].
  16. United Nations Organization. Security Council. Preliminary report of the meeting of the Security Council Sixty-ninth year, 7144th meeting. S / PV.7144. [In Russian].
  17. Arguments and facts. (2014, July 11). Putin wrote off 90% of Cuba’s debts to the USSR for $ 32 billion. [In Russian].
  18. Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media of the Russian Federation. (2014, July 13). Russia and Argentina signed an agreement on cooperation in the field of mass communications. [In Russian].
  19. Website of the President of Russia. (2014, March 25). Telephone conversation with President of Argentina Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner. [In Russian].
  20. Center of Global Studies «Strategy XXI». [In Ucrainian].
  21. Shevchenko, N. (2021). «Crimean dimension» of Ukrainian-Latin American relations (2014 – 2021) : analytical note. Ukranian Prism. [In Ukrainian].
  22. Shevchenko, N. (2020) Latin America and the Caribbean: the interests of Ukraine : analytical note. Ukranian Prism. [In Ukrainian].
  23. Beltrán, U., Cruz, A. (2014, Marzo 31). México no debe interferir en Crimea según encuesta. Excelsior. [In Spanish].
  24. El País (EFE Economía). (2013, Noviembre 1). Bolivia, pieza clave en el «gran juego» de los intereses rusos en Suramérica. [In Spanish].
  25. RANKhiGS. (2014). Center for Research of International Institutions. BRICS Ministers Meet on the Sidelines of the Nuclear Security Summit in the Hague March 24, 2014, The Hague. [In English].
  26. Câmera, M. (2014, Março 19). Em Paris, chanceler brasileiro defende diálogo para crise na Crimeia. BBC Brasil. [In Portuguese].
  27. Chaguaceda, A. (2019, March 28). Russia and Nicaragua: Progress in bilateral cooperation. Global Americans. [In English].
  28. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. República de Chile. (2014, Febrero 21). Comunicado de Prensa sobre la situación en Ucrania. [In Spanish].
  29. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. República de Colombia. (2014, Febrero 20). Comunicado del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores sobre la situación en Ucrania. Comunicado de Prensa. [In Spanish].
  30. Emisión nº 384 del programa El Otro Medio. (2014, May 29). Conversamos con el Embajador de Ucrania, Yurii Diudin, acerca de la situación en Ucrania.–cacUO0FZaA. [In Spanish].
  31. Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales. Secretaría General. (2014, Abril 3). Costa Rica aboga por diálogo en Ucrania. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. [In Spanish].
  32. Notimeríca (2019, Junio 12). ¿Cuáles son los nuevos acuerdos firmados entre Bolivia y Rusia? [In Spanish].
  33. Cuesta, J. G. (2021, Octubre 22). Bolivia y Rusia estrechan su vínculo con acuerdos de explotación del litio y el gas. El País Internacional. [In Spanish].
  34. Diudin, Y. (2014, Mayo 18). «La anexión de Crimea a Rusia estaba predeterminada». Equilibrium Global. [In Spanish].
  35. Diudin, Y. (2014, Abril 28). La situación de Ucrania ante la coyuntura internacional. CARI. Sesión académica a cargo de Su Excelencia D. Yurii Diudin, Embajador de Ucrania, organizada por el Grupo de Trabajo sobre Estudios Contemporáneos del Espacio Euroasiático. [In Spanish].
  36. Diudin, Y. (2014, Abril 14). Las acciones belicistas rusas, un atentado contra el orden creado tras la Segunda Guerra. La Nacion. [In Spanish].
  37. Duarte, F. (2014, Outubro 23). «Não faria o que Diego Costa fez», diz artilheiro do Shakhtar convocado por Dunga. BBC Brasil. [In Portuguese].
  38. América Economía. (2014, Marzo 29). Ecuador considera «ilegítimo» al gobierno de Ucrania. [In Spanish].
  39. Embajada de Ucrania en Uruguay (2014). Entrevista y Artículos. [In Spanish].
  40. Frases de famosos. Frases de Porfirio Díaz. MODE TO ACCESS: [In Spanish].
  41. Fúnez, R. S. (2014, March 11). Russia’s Military Power in Latin America. Americas Quarterly. [In English].
  42. A critica. (2014, Março 15). G-7 cobra posição firme do Brasil na crise ucraniana. [In Portuguese].
  43. Bahia Noticia. (2014, Março 15). G-7 cobra posição firme do Brasil na crise ucraniana. [In Portuguese].
  44. Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales. (2014, Marzo 27). Secretaría General. Integridad y autodeterminación en Ucrania. [In Spanish].
  45. Mendonça, R. (2014, Março 19). Crise na Ucrânia mergulha futebol em caos e gera temores de confrontos em estádios. BBC Brasil. [In Portuguese].
  46. Mijares, V. M. (2014, April 3). The Ukrainian Crisis and Latin America. Americas Quarterly. [In Spanish].
  47. Moura, M. (2014, Julho18). O desastre aéreo de Putin. Época. [In Portuguese].
  48. Murillo, Á. (2014, Mayo 13). Ucrania hace «lobby» en contra de Rusia en Centroamérica (El embajador ucranio en la región advierte de que los aliados de Moscú podría imitar en el futuro su falta de respeto a las fronteras). El País. Madrid, [In Spanish].
  49. Negroponte, D. V. (2018, June 19). Russian Interests in Venezuela: A New Cold War?. Americas Quarterly. [In English].
  50. Paraguassu, L. (2014, Março 15). G-7 cobra posição firme do Brasil na crise ucraniana. O Estado de S.Paulo. [In Portuguese].
  51. Peregil, F. (2014, Marzo 25). Putin agradece a Cristina Fernández su postura sobre Crimea. El País. Madrid. [In Spanish].
  52. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto. Argentina. (2014, Marzo 25). El Presidente Putin llamó a la Presidenta Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. Información para la Prensa N°059/14. [In Spanish].
  53. United Nations. General Assembly. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 27 March 2014. A/RES/68/262. Territorial integrity of Ukraine. Sixty-eighth session. Agenda item 33 (b). [In English].
  54. Strategic Culture Foundation. (2014, April 12). Russia sets 4 conditions in return for aid to Ukraine. [In English].
  55. Sabino, A. (2014, Abril 8). Clube de Donetsk dá garantia de fuga a jogadores brasileiros. Folha de S.Paulo. [In Portuguese].
  56. UN. Security Council. (2014, March 15). Security Council Fails to Adopt Text Urging Member States Not to Recognize Planned 16 March Referendum in Ukraine’s Crimea Region. [In English].
  57. Ministério das Relações Exteriores. (2014, Fevereiro 19). Situação na Ucrânia. [In Portuguese].
  58. Teles de Menezes, G. O. (2018). O Brasil e as questões do Kosovo e da Crimeia. NEIBA, SimpoRI, VII, 11. DOI: [In Portuguese].
  59. The Guardian. (2014, April 8).Venezuela protests are sign that US wants our oil, says Nicolas Maduro. [In English].