Erosion of US Strategy of China’s Engagement as a Constructive Liberal Model

DOI: 10.17721/2521-1706.2019.08.02

Makar Taran

PhD in History, Associate Professor, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv, Ukraine

Abstract

The proposed article surveys the key elements of US engagement China strategy as a model of China`s involvement in the world relations system within the framework of the global strategy of functioning of the world order. Such a conceptual attitude largely resonates with US strategic plans after the end of World War II, when China was also expected to enter the “World Orchestra” of states as part of it. The authors of the China`s engagement strategy also took into account the fact that the means of pressure, sanctions and other forms of pressure have historically been exhausted and have not led to desired changes in the internal Chinese affairs. As a constructivist ideology, engagement was the only possible way of bilateral interactions. Various forms of communication with Chinese society would provide political and value accommodation of liberal concepts in and prevent from rising any form of revisionism and anti-Americanism.

Engagement of China strategy has played a historic role. However, regarding far-reaching goals, China’s foreign policy behavior and domestic policy, especially during the Xi Jinping period, on the contrary, have begun to develop in the opposite scenario to Washington’s expectations. Starting approx. from 2008 China has been demonstrating more assertive and global oriented foreign policy strategy. The Engagement as a form of constructive liberal model of interrelation where both side are able to reach an (business kind) agreement dashed hopes of many US policy-makers. As a result, the debates unleashed in image related to more pragmatic attitudes towards China.  And coming to power in the United States of the D. Trump`s administration was also under circumstances of reassessment of the US efforts to transform China into a “responsible shareholder.” And at present we observe the first conflict knot in the current US – China relations – trade war. Anyway, and this case proved it, yet, the new paradigm of Chinese policy cannot, due to many factors, reject the positives elements of an engagement strategy.

Key words: the US foreign policy, China engagement strategy, US – China relations, the PRC, D. Trump`s China policy.

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