

*Egypt is the most densely populated Arabic country. And although it is still unable to play a leading role in the Arab world, Egypt still remains an influential country in the region due to its historical heritage.*

*The current administration of the United States has expressed great hopes for the American-Egyptian relations that have suffered from some serious tensions. However, there is a risk that cooperation with the official Cairo might be repressive, placing US-Egyptian relations at a shaky foundation over the next few years.*

*The article covers the author's vision of the events on the basis of the original sources, which have been mostly presented by those in the Western press. The article is therefore generally based on a chronological analysis of the situation that took place in the history of relations between the two countries. Despite the fixed historical facts published in the context of certain events, the author keeps her own right on the analysis of the abovementioned events.*

**Key words:** Arab Spring, American-Egyptian relations, president, democracy, elections, Egypt, the USA.

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## **THE ROLE OF THE USA IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROJECT BAKU-TBILISI-CEYHAN**

**Abstract.** *After the signing of the contract of the century in 1994, the itineraries for new routes to transport the energy resources of Azerbaijan, a country without direct access to the ocean, has been the subject of fierce debate against the backdrop of the geopolitical interests of the world's major powers. While the construction of the Baku-Batumi oil pipeline in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century was a challenge of a technological nature, this time the main "gamble" was geopolitical. The article therefore considers choosing of alternatives of true transport routes and an impact of the USA thereupon. The BTC project is the first comprehensive project aimed at changing the status quo in the region; the latter being the only alternative route to export oil out of the region, the Russian route to Novorossiysk. Since 1993, Russia, which is still the most notable power in Central Asia and Caucasus, did its utmost to keep the region under its uncontested influence by utilizing every possible political, economic and military instrument within the framework of its popular "Near Abroad" doctrine. For the first time, Russia's monopoly over oil export routes from the Caspian region has been broken. This article also analyses the course of events that led to the realization of the BTC pipeline where an American policy played an important role.*

**Key words:** USA, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, American policy, BP, Caucasus, project.

The contract of the century provided for the transport of crude oil in two phases: the search for a solution for the transport of early oil, and the selection of the main export pipeline [14, p. 109].

SOCAR had announced the existence of three options: north (Russia), south (Iran) and west (Turkey). The first option (north) was favoured by Moscow, but due to instability in the North Caucasus, the consortium members demanded guarantees in relation to Chechen territory. The AIOC (Azerbaijan International Operating Company) evaluated the risk of interruptions to the transport of Azeri crude oil and feared being

caught up in the hostilities in Chechnya, where the situation on the ground remained fragile. The Russians planned to construct a new pipeline segment and use the rail network to circumvent Chechnya and convinced the AIOC that the northern route was safe. But the intervention of Chechen combatants in Dagestan in August 1999, combined with a series of terrorist attacks in Moscow in September [8, p. 334–335], further complicated matters and undermined the arguments put forward.

The second option (south) was to construct a pipeline that would cross Iran from north to south and provide access to the Persian Gulf. It was considered to be economically attractive but politically complicated, as the poor relations between the Islamic regime in Iran and the United States constituted a considerable obstacle. The Americans declared that “Iran was a competitor and not a partner” [2, p. 19] and ruled out any cooperation with it in this area. On top of this, they imposed limits on investments by international companies in Iran’s energy sector.

Finally, the western option appeared to be met with wider support. A working group made up of representatives from SOCAR, the AIOC and the Azerbaijani government – set up following a decision by President Heydar Aliyev on 5 September 1997 to study its technical, economic and financial aspects and make a recommendation for the most advantageous route [4, p. 18] – reviewed all of the geographic possibilities before announcing its preference for access to the Mediterranean via Turkey. This choice was favored by the AIOC [1, p. 35], as the Mediterranean was considered “The most attractive market for Caspian crude” [11, p. 23] oil, but the most appropriate means of transport had yet to be defined.

Having considered all the sites of each of the options, external and internal factors influencing the transit countries, the interested parties opted for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project. This route was originally on the focus of attention. The project was supported in the USA and its positive prospects were associated with Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. Support for the project by Azerbaijan and Georgia was prompted by such considerations: in the context of a decline in world oil prices, its transit may yield revenues that are compared with the profit from its sale and of course political dividends. The interest of Turkey, where the demand for energy is growing dynamically, was deprived of huge revenues from the transit of Iraqi oil, Ankara, having joined the project, could compensate for these losses, as well as increase its influence on the new independent states of the Caspian Sea. However, when discussing the project, certain problems emerged [2, p. 485]. So, there were doubts about its reality after the negotiations of the US leadership with the main shareholders of oil companies.

It should be noted that if, after the collapse of the USSR, the United States viewed the post-Soviet region as the “first Russia”, then from the end of 1994 it was replaced by the policy “security first” [9]. The National Security Strategy which was enacted in 1994 for the first time points out that the Caspian oil can be used to reduce the dependence of the country on the Middle East [10].

At the initial stage, the BP was against the implementation of this pipeline, considering the project incomprehensible from an economic point of view. But coming to power in 1997 of Tony Blair led to the transformation of the British foreign policy. “Special relationship” of the United States and Britain after Tony Blair came to power acquired a new stage, thereby providing a convergence of foreign policy of the two countries. Thus, the UK began to consider the development of the Caspian energy resources in the framework of not only its economic interests, but also from the point of view of the security of the Euro-Atlantic region [12, p. 409–410].

For the US, the project meant the opportunity to push Russia away from the "big oil" of the Caspian Sea and, having established its control over its transportation, further strengthening its influence and ensure its geopolitical interests in the Caucasus region. As S. Kinser wrote in the New York Times (19.11.1999), "Construction of the oil pipeline will cost \$ 2.4 billion and will provide the United States and other countries of the West with access to a new important source of energy. In addition, the pipeline will be laid out of the Russian territory, which will lead to increased US influence in the region. Western leaders failed to persuade Yeltsin to end the war in Chechnya, but their success in reaching agreement on the construction of the pipeline is much more important, as it weakens Russia's position in the North Caucasus and Central Asia" [2, p. 486].

The Russian analyst S. Smirnov in the "Continent" publishes: "Washington's interest in this project is obvious: it needs a Caspian oil pipeline, which Russia could not afford. The implementation of this project will allow the US to kill several birds with one stone. Such a pipeline, linking the fields on the Caspian Sea with the Mediterranean coast of Turkey (the US partner in NATO), will allow the United States not only to diversify energy sources and ease dependence on oil imports from the Persian Gulf countries, but also significantly strengthen its political and, unconditionally, economic influence on the Central Asian and Caucasus regions" [2, p. 486].

Therefore, the shareholders were asked to "take the time to make a final decision". A famous American newspaper The New York Times wrote that attempts to convince the main oil companies of the need to build a several billion-dollar Baku-Ceyhan pipeline prove unsuccessful. In the world press also appeared skeptical publications, questioning the economic feasibility of the "project of the century".

British "Financial Times" believed that the project, signed under the patronage of the United States, is at first "political" act, which does not give guarantees for real construction. The opinion that the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline will help ensure a strong US presence in this part of the world, and also to isolate Russia and Iran from oil export routes, was shared by most analysts, and private investors were interested not so much in politics as in profits in which there were big doubts [7, p. 486–487].

Official Washington feared that the pipeline could be out of the game.

This would seriously weaken the US position in the Caspian region. One of the high-ranking officials of the State Department was even forced to say: "To be honest, this is our defeat. We consider this project to be a priority, but we are not able to implement it. We want to receive something without giving anything.

This is a great loss to our interests and, of course, our prestige." Senator S. Brownback linked the reason for the failure of the US administration to the fact that B. Clinton "lost the ability of moral conviction because of scandals that surround him." However, the true reason for the reluctance of companies to participate in the project in the main was the low price of oil for that period and the uncertainty about the volumes that will be produced in the Caspian during the next five years. However, the real reason for the reluctance of companies to participate in the project was mainly the low price of oil for that period and the uncertainty about the volumes that will be produced in the Caspian during the next five years.[6, p. 264–265].

Nevertheless, oil companies nevertheless agreed to pay part of the cost of building the pipeline, but US President Bill Clinton refused this unwelcome politically "alms". Unable to subsidize the Baku Ceyhan project on its own, US officials tried to convince Turkey, through which a large part of the pipeline was to pass through, to provide

benefits to American oil companies, but Ankara refused to do so, having put forward a number of reasons [3, p. 75].

The West made it clear to Iran and Russia that the strategic prospects for the transit of Caspian energy resources are related to the implementation of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project. In the United States, under the White House, a special interagency group on the Caspian was set up, before which all the participants in the Main Export Pipeline construction were to report. In 1999, more than a quarter of the funds of this financial institution were connected with the Caspian region. In his estimation, the construction of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline should cost about \$ 3.5 billion, but, he continued, "there is no limit to the amount of money that we are ready to allocate for this project." The director of the Corporation for Private Investments, R. Munos, named the amount of subsidies proposed and registered at the end of 1999 to the region, including capital investments for the construction of pipelines, which amounted to \$ 10 billion. The implementation of all Caspian projects, according to the Americans, requires an investment of \$ 20 billion [2, p. 488].

Meanwhile, in May 1999, the discussion of the Baku-Ceyhan project was again intensified, which once again demonstrated the geopolitical interest of Washington, which usually protects the interests of American business. Now he forced the oil companies to take commercial risks and losses to please the political interests of the West. In a very difficult situation appeared the British company BP-AMOCO, which, under enormous pressure from Washington, accepted certain obligations to participate in the construction of the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline. Large shareholders of this company did not want to participate in the risky to their opinion, construction [12, p. 410]. The vice-president of the Chevron company R. Matske noted: "The pipeline is not being built until it detects oil. To justify the construction of another large pipeline, it will need a little more. "He had in mind the forecasts for the reserves of the Caspian region, which, as some experts thought, were overestimated. It was initially recognized that the bottom of the Caspian Sea contains between 15 and 30 billion tons of oil, in other words 1/5 of the world's reserves. However, over time it was found that the resources of the Caspian make up about 2% of the world's oil deposits. Special adviser to the President and Secretary of State for Energy Policy in the Caspian region, R. Morningstar, stated: "The Middle East will not become this region, and its resources are comparable only to the North Sea. In this situation, the government will not "wring out" the oil companies, since it recognizes that it is not advisable to spend \$ 4 billion on the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline at the current oil price. "On the other hand, Y. Kalitsky, adviser to the Ministry of Trade on cooperation with the CIS countries, insisted on comparing the Caspian Sea with hydrocarbon reserves with Kuwait and called the figure up to 90 billion barrels [2, p. 490–491].

One of the merits of the BTC project is its detailed elaboration. And the presentation of its took place in 1998. Baku-Tbilisi Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline carries oil from the Azeri-Chirag-Deepwater Gunashli (ACG) field and condensate from Shah Deniz across Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. It links Sangachal terminal on the shores of the Caspian Sea to Ceyhan marine terminal on the Turkish Mediterranean coast. In addition, crude oil from Turkmenistan continues to be transported via the pipeline. Starting in October 2013, we have also resumed transportation of some volumes of Tengiz crude oil from Kazakhstan through the BTC pipeline. The pipeline that became operational in June 2006 was built by the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline company (BTC Co) operated by BP.

The pipeline buried along its entire length is 1768km in total length: 443km in Azerbaijan, 249km in Georgia, and 1,076km in Turkey. The Azerbaijan and Georgia sections of the pipeline are operated by BP on behalf of its shareholders in BTC Co. while the Turkish section is operated by BOTAS International Limited (BIL) [5].

Initially, the BTC is anticipated as a project to contribute to the region's economic development. However, the political and strategic impact the project would have on the Caspian-Caucasus region proved to be more significant. Such impact will definitely affect both Turkish and American economic and political interests in the region. When the project is completed, it is expected to add a geoeconomic dimension to Turkey's well known "geostrategic importance" by placing Turkey right in the middle of an energy network which involves most of the regional oil and natural gas transportation projects [13]. The US on the other hand, will not only be able to decrease its historical dependence on the Persian Gulf oil, but also enhance its international economic influence by assisting the American oil companies' efforts in the Caspian basin. Furthermore, by providing diplomatic and economic support for a pipeline passing through the territories of a NATO ally, the US would also prevent powers such as Russia and Iran from totally controlling the region's oil and gas riches as well.

Finally, the BTC probably had significant geoeconomic and geostrategic consequences for the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the region as well. It is known that nearly all of these countries are dependent on their energy resources for their economic reconstruction which is a vital ingredient of their attempts for real political and economic independence from the Russian Federation. On the other hand, since 1993, Russia, which is still the most notable power in Central Asia and Caucasus, did its utmost to keep the region under its uncontested influence by utilizing every possible political, economic and military instrument within the framework of its popular "Near Abroad" doctrine. Such Russian attempts, however, clashed with the global interests of the US. Consequently, the common objective of the US in the region has turned out to be the prevention of Russia's full control of the region starting from the middle of the 1990s. The BTC has been the most important instrument in order to realize this common objective.

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#### РОЛЬ США У РЕАЛІЗАЦІЇ ПРОЕКТУ БАКУ-ТБІЛІСІ-ДЖЕЙХАН

*Анотація.* Після підписання договору століття в 1994 р. проекти для нових шляхів транспортування енергетичних ресурсів Азербайджану, країни без прямого доступу до океану, були предметом жорстких дебатів на фоні геополітичних інтересів головних світових держав. Хоча будівництво нафтопроводу Баку-Батумі на початку ХХ століття було складним завданням технологічного характеру, на цей раз головною «авантюрою» був геополітичний аспект. У статті автор розглядає можливість вибору альтернатив справжніх транспортних маршрутів та впливу США на цей процес. Проект БТД – це

перший комплексний проект, спрямований на зміну статус-кво в регіоні; єдиний альтернативний шлях експорту нафти з регіону російському маршруту до Новоросійська. З 1993 року Росія, яка все ще є найбільш провідною силою в Центральній Азії та на Кавказі, зробила все можливе, щоб зберегти регіон під своїм безперечним контролем, використовуючи всі можливі політичні, економічні та військові інструменти в рамках своєї популярної доктрини «Близького Зарубіжжя». Вперше російська монополія на шляхи експорту нафти з Каспійського регіону була порушена. Ця стаття також аналізує хід подій, які призвели до реалізації газопроводу БТД, де американська політика відіграла важливу роль.

**Ключові слова:** США, нафтопровід Баку-Тбілісі-Джейхан, американська політика, Кавказ, проект.

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## ПІДГОТОВКА СПОЛУЧЕНИХ ШТАТІВ АМЕРИКИ ДО ВІЙНИ З ЯПОНІЄЮ: ПЛАНИ ТА РЕАЛЬНІСТЬ

**Анотація.** В статті описуються загальні риси стратегічного планування збройними силами Сполучених Штатів Америки війни з Японською Імперією у період з 1906 по 1940 рік. Вказується на внутрішньополітичну причину появи цього плану та зовнішньополітичну причину його скасування. Розкриваються проблеми, з якими зітнулися американські військові планувальники під час розробки та підготовки до реалізації плану війни з Японією. Дається загальна оцінка результатів праці американських військових планувальників по розробці та підготовці до реалізації плану війни з Японією. Так, загальна стратегічна концепція плану війни США з Японією на загал витримала перевірку часом, що свідчить про високий рівень професіоналізму американських військових планувальників. Однак на заваді виконанню цих планів стали численні проблеми. Показується, що така складна справа, як стратегічне воєнне планування, має відбуватись на підставі чітко визначених політичним керівництвом країни вказівок, з урахуванням дипломатичних реалій та фактичних можливостей збройних сил країни. Стратегічні плани не повинні бути «річчю в собі» – вони мають регулярно переглядатись і, за потреби, змінюватись відповідно до реальної ситуації.

**Ключові слова:** Підготовка збройних сил США до війни з Японією, Помаранчевий план війни, Збройні сили США, стратегічне планування, Друга світова війна на Тихоокеанському ТВД.

Протягом 34 років збройні сили Сполучених Штатів Америки готувались до війни з Японською Імперією. Ця підготовка впливала на зовнішню політику США, на будівництво їх збройних сил (особливо Флоту (Військово-морських сил) США) і навіть на будівництво торгового флоту. Однак до цього часу в українській американістиці не було навіть загального огляду підготовки США до війни з Японією на рівні стратегічного планування. З іншого боку треба зазначити, що навіть в США існує лише одна монографія [7] та, частково, одна дисертація [9], спеціально присвячені детальному вивченню цього питання в цілому. Інші праці стосуються лише певних аспектів чи проблем цієї підготовки.