Why should America support Ukraine?

Nataliya Gorodnia, Doctor of History, Associate Professor, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv, Ukraine.

Abstract

The paper reveals principal factors of the U.S. support of Ukraine during Russia’s aggression and the place of Ukraine in the system of the U.S. national interests. The author argues that before Russia’s aggression Washington prioritized relations with Russia to other post-Soviet nations, including Ukraine. The U.S. interests to Ukraine before the crisis, besides its nuclear disarmament, were caused mainly by geopolitical calculations. Because of Ukraine’s strategic location between Russia and Europe, developments in Ukrainian-Russian relations indicated trends in Russia’s policy and the prospects of its interactions with Europe.

The reasons of America’s support of Ukraine during the “Ukrainian crisis” are generalized in terms of ensuring security, fulfillment of international commitments, realization of leadership, and protection of values. The U.S. should support Ukraine because of 1) Russia’s gross violation of international norms that ruins post-war order in Europe and threatens European security; 2) the U.S.’ obligations to Ukraine according to 1994 Budapest Memorandum; 3) America’s status as a global leader that oblige it to protect and strengthen a rules-based international order, including the rights of small and medium nations in it; 4) its political traditions of promotion democratic and liberal values, embodied in the Ukrainian “Revolution of Dignity”. So called “Ukrainian” crisis is actually the Russia’s one as it caused by Kremlin’s revisionist policy. It reveals essential changes in the 21st century world. The U.S. support of Ukraine means a defense of fundamental values and norms that shape contemporary liberal global architecture. The results of the crisis will determine the rules in world politics, fundamental features of the international order, and the U.S. role in it.

Keywords
 Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the U.S. policy towards Ukraine

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DOI http://doi.org/10.17721/2521-1706.2016.02.69-77